The First World War: Triggers

The Balkan Wars, 1912-13

In 1908 there was a Coup d'Etat in Turkey organised by a group of officers known as the Young Turks. This lead to the remaining Balkan states attempting to gain independence. On October 5th 1908 the Prince of Bulgaria declared himself King of Bulgaria. On October 6th 1908 Austria-Hungary annexed the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russians initially agreed to this in return for control of the Dardanelles, but the Austrians acted whilst the Russian foreign minister Isvolsky was touring Europe, so the event lead to bad feeling between Austria-Hungary and Russia. A diplomatic crisis followed, but Austria was backed by Germany, and the Russians were forced to acquiesce. The events cemented the bond between Austria and Germany. The Kaiser declared that he had stood by the Austrian Emperor like a knight 'in shining armour'. However, tension remained in the Balkans after the Balkan crisis. There was a majority of Slavs in Bosnia, and they expected union with Serbia. Meanwhile, Serbia was protected by Russia. Croats and Slovenes also wanted independence. In 1909 there was the trial in Zagreb of 50 people accused of conspiracy on trumped-up evidence. During this period the contemporary historian Heinrick Friedjung was led to accuse leading Croats and Serbs of treason. This was based on forged evidence, and he later withdrew the accusation.

In 1911, the Italian navy attacked Turkey in the Dardanelles in order to secure her influence in Libya. Italy defeated Turkey and gained Cyrenaica, Tripoli and the Dodecanes. The Turkish were exposed to be weak.

In Spring 1912 Serbia and Bulgaria allied. Greece and Montenegro joined this Balkan League in Autumn 1912. The Balkan League defeated the Turkish in two battles. However, in a Second Balkan War Serbia and Greece defeated Bulgaria. Austria sought to limit Serbian gains, whilst Russia sought to support them. The British hoped to mediate. But Austria was thwarted by the Second Balkan War and Russia was enhanced, since Serbia was strongly influenced by Russia. The Austrians were threatened by Serbian nationalism.

In May 1913, at the Treaty of London, the Turks yielded control of the Balkans except for Constantinople and the Eastern part of Thrace.

The German Chief of Staff wrote to the Austrian Chief of Staff in February 1913 that “A European war must come sooner or later in which ultimately the struggle will be one between Germany and Slavism ... but the aggression must come from the Slavs.”

The July Crisis, 1914

On 28th June 1914, Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne, was assassinated at Sarajevo in Bosnia. The assassination was organised by the Serbian General Staff. The Austrians, however, were not able to respond swiftly. For example, the Hungarian prime minister, Tisza, delayed matters by insisting on all protocols being adhered to. He insisted that no Slavs should actually be taken over until German support was guaranteed.

On 5 July, however, the Kaiser issued his 'blank cheque' - unequivocal support for Austria in the Balkans. Thus the Germans gave full support to Austria-Hungary. Germany was fully aware of the ultimatum being prepared against Serbia. The Germans did believe that war would be triggered by Russian mobilization. On 19th July the text of an ultimatum was agreed upon and on 23rd July the ultimatum was sent to Serbia. It required: (1) the Serbian government to forbid activities against Austria on Serbian territory; (2) The Serbain government was required to ban a nationalist organisation; (3) Austrian officials would be allowed to take part in an enquiry into the assassination of the Archduke. The ultimatum was delivered on 24th July.

On 24th July the Russian foreign minister Sazanov learnt of the terms of the ultimatum. On 25th July the Serbs appealed to the Tsar for help. At this time the French president, Raymond Poincare, and Prime Minister Rene Viviani were returning from Russia. They left on July 24th and only returned on July 30th. The Tsar ordered mobilisation. Because of military plans, mobilisation was forced to take place along the whole frontier of Russia. The Serbs were prepared to negotiate with the Austrians, but the Austrians gave them only 48 hours to decide and they opted to fight.

On 27th July Grey endeavoured to obtain German support for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but Berlin rejected this. On 28 July Austria declared war on Serbia and Belgrade was bombarded by gunboats. The Kaiser began to have second thoughts, but German chief of staff, Moltke, had already called for Austria's immediate mobilisation. On 30th July Russia issued a full mobilisation order. Once Russia mobilised Germany was committed by the Schieffen Plan [The Schieffen plan was the plan of the German High Command in the event of a European war to defeat France first by a flank attack through Belgium. Thereafter, forces would be deployed to the Eastern front for a longer offensive against Russia.] to wage war against both France and Russia. On 31st July the Germans telegraphed an ultimatum to St. Petersburg and Paris calling on Russia to suspend warlike activities within twelve hours and demanding that France remains neutral. It also demanded that France handed over the fortresses of Toul and Verdun. On 1st August, Germany mobilized. On the 2nd August the Germans demanded passage through Belgium. Belgium refused, but the Germans advanced regardless. Germany declared war on France on 3rd August.

On 4th August Britain declared war on Germany, following the decision of the British cabinet on 2nd August to agree to fight if Belgium neutrality was violated. Britain's response was uncertain up to the last. There were demonstrations in London on 1st to 3rd August in favour of war. The British were aware that sooner or later they would have to confront a strengthened Germany alone. Britain decided to join on the French side even before the attack on Belgium, which provided the legal basis for British intervention.

The Fritz Fischer thesis

In 1961 Fritz Fischer maintained that Germany was responsible for the 1st World War and that there was a clear line of continuity between the foreign policy aims of Imperial Germany in 1914 and Nazi Germany in 1939.

In 1897 Weltpolitik started. Fisher maintains that Germany “embarked on a course aiming at nothing less than parity with the British world empire, if not more.” However, Fisher thesis may assume that there was more direction to German foreign policy than there really was. Between 1898 - 1901 British overtures for alliance were rejected. This caused Britain to sign an alliance with Japan in 1902 and an entente with France in 1904.

Crises in Bosnia (1908 -9), Morocco (1911); Balkan Wars (1912-13) did not result in continental war. During this period there were also genuine efforts to improve Anglo-German relations. But at the same time German diplomacy during the Bosnian crisis was high-handed, and supplementary naval laws of 1906 and 1908 significantly strengthened the Germany navy. Bethmann sought rapprochement with Britain. Britain wanted a reduction of German naval strength; the German's wanted a promise of neutrality in the event of an attack by France or Russia; the demands on both sides were too great. The Second Moroccan crisis strengthened the Anglo-French entente - Britain perceived Germany as the bully.

Fisher maintains that German humiliation in the Second Moroccan Crisis created bitterness. During the Balkan Wars of 1912 Germany held a war council on 8 December 1912. Clearly, Germans were planning for war and Moltke was saying “war sooner than better”. Early months of 1914 saw a sharp decrease in Russo-German relations. Probably, the Germans were not planning the war, but they may have seen war as inevitable.

The structuralists accept that Germany was responsible for the war; they see it as a response to accumulating domestic pressures - the Prussian elites's attempt to preserve power in the face of the Social Democrats. Stürmer argues that the exposed geostrategic position of Germany must be seen as one of the vital factors in the making of German foreign policy. It is probably at the least that the German leadership was responsible for the worsening international atmosphere up to 1914 and the escalation of the July crisis into war.