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Stalin and International Relations

The Comintern

The Comintern - the Communist International Organisation - was established in 1919 in order to promote worldwide revolution. But the Bolsheviks did not believe that the Soviet Union was sufficiently strong to create such a worldwide movement. They regarded survival as the real top priority. Events after 1917 did not conform to the standard Marxist theory - there was no proletarian revolution in other countries. When the Soviets invaded Poland in 1920 there was no popular uprising - but rather the Red Army was repulsed. Lenin decided on a policy of co-existence; he was pragmatic, adjusting policy to circumstance. In this he followed the tradition in Russian foreign policy, which was always dominated by fear of Western encroachment. In 1922 Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Rapallo - being both (in Lloyd George's words) 'pariah nations' they were thrown together. The treaty allowed Germany to flout the Versailles Treaty by training their troops within Russia and granting trading rights to Russia in return. Stalin inherited the treaty and didn't choose to alter it.

Soviet Foreign Policy 1924- 29

In 1921 Britain signed a preliminary trade agreement with Russia and in 1924 this nearly developed into an Anglo-Soviet treaty. But the forged Zinoviev letter, published during the British General Election in October 1924, put an end to that, and to the Labour government. The Conservatives under Baldwin withdrew recognition of the Soviet Union and in 1927 the UK government authorised a police raid on the Russian trade delegation in London. An acrimonious atmosphere ensued and diplomatic relations between Britain and Russia were suspended. The 1929 the Labour Government under Ramsay MacDonald restored formal recognition of the USSR. However, the actions of the Comintern contradicted the foreign policy of the USSR and created suspicion.
Initially, Stalin let the Comintern do mainly what it liked, although foreign communist parties affiliating with it were required to pledge loyalty to the Soviet Union. Thus, the Comintern was turned into an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. An example of this is Stalin's insistence that the Chinese Communists under Mao remained allied to the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, contrary to the interests of the communists. Trotsky attacked this policy and claimed that Stalin was ruining the possibility of a Chinese revolution. Chiang purged communists and in time Mao decided to abandon the alliance, Stalin and the Comintern. In 1927 there were constant rumours of a Western invasion of Russia; in Poland an anti-Soviet government under Pilsudski, who had led the repulse of the Red Army in 1920, was formed. Although there never was a capitalist conspiracy against Russia, the belief that there was one was real enough. This forced the USSR and Germany closer together at the time. However, the 1925 Locarno Treaty worried Stalin, and in response to it he instigated investigations and trials of Germans working in the Soviet Union.

Soviet Foreign Policy 1929 - 33

Trade Unionists in the West believed the best of Soviet Russia and this was one reason why the second Labour government of 1929-31 restored recognition of the Soviet Union. There was another start to trade negotiations. However, in other respects Stalin was adopting less flexible arrangements. His victory over Bukharin and the right was followed by instructions to all Moscow affiliated Communist parties not to form alliances with other progressive parties. Parties like the British Labour Party and leaders like Leon Blum in France and Ramsay MacDonald in Britain were condemned as 'socio-fascists' delaying the movement towards the full revolution. At the same time, artificial confidence in Soviet economic planning was boosted by the difficulties of the capitalist system during the depression. It seemed that links with non-Marxist socialist parties were not needed. Further, until 1933 the Nazis were not considered as a threat and the KPD - the German Communist Party - was encouraged to cooperate with the Nazis. Stalin failed to appreciate the need to organise the left against fascism whilst there was still time.

Soviet Foreign Policy 1933-39

After Hitler came to power, Stalin tried to maintain the spirit of Rapello and the German-Soviet alliance. But Nazi attacks on the KPD and German open espousal of the policy of expansion into the USSR caused the Soviets to once again fear isolation. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations in 1934 and in 1935 there was an agreement between France, Czechoslovakia and the USSR to provide 'mutual assistance' should any one of them be attacked. Also in that year the Comintern announced its permission for Marxist parties to ally with other left wing parties to form a 'popular front' against fascism. The 1936 constitution was intended to convince the world that USSR was a democratic state. But Britain and France inclined towards appeasement and in 1935 the Italian invasion of Abyssinia was met with by the Hoare-Laval Plan, which effectively acceded to Italian aggression. In November 1936 the fascist powers of Germany, Italy and Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact. Stalin sought with renewed vigour for new allies, but the impression that the Soviet Union could not be trusted could not be shaken off. Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War was unduly influenced by selfish considerations. Soviet military equipment was sent, but the Republic had to transfer its gold reserves to the USSR in payment. Stalin was not, in fact, eager to see the Spanish Republicans win because he was worried that a communist state in Southern Europe would upset Britain and France. In 1938 the Munich agreement continued the mood of appeasement and Hitler seemed able to do anything in Europe with impunity. Molotov, as foreign minister, proposed formal alliances to France and Britain, but neither nation could trust Stalin, and preferred to ally with Poland.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939 - 41

In August 1939 Molotov and Ribbentrop signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact and in September 1939 German forces invaded Poland. In October 1939 the Soviets and Germans agreed to partition Poland. Although this foreign policy decision was a volte-face, Stalin wanted the creation of a second front, but the Allies thought a premature invasion would be madness. As the war drew to a conclusion, ideological differences between the Allies became more marked. The Soviets feared the Allies would combine with Germany against them; the Allies feared Communist expansion in Europe. The Yalta conference of February 1945 was marked by considerable tension; agreements failed to deal with the major problems. It was agreed to divide Germany into four zones, but there was no agreement on what form the German government would take. The Soviets wanted reparations from Germany, but the West wanted to rebuild Germany. The question of Poland was not settled and in the meantime the USSR had installed a pro-Soviet government. The Allied Declaration on Liberated Europe appeared to commit the USSR to holding elections in Eastern Europe, but it was up to the USSR to determine what democracy meant. In the event, the Soviets regarded Eastern Europe as a buffer against Germany. Russia did join the United Nations, but insisted on the principle of single-member veto in the five-nation UN Security council. It was expected that the war against Japan would last for some years. The USSR proposed to enter the war in return for acquisition of large portions of Chinese territory. The development of the atom bomb changed the picture. Stalin, however, still declared war and claimed Chinese territory. At the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 there was no further progress between the Western Allies and USSR on fundamentals. The Allies were convinced that Soviet actions in Poland and Eastern Europe indicated that Stalin proposed to impose on these countries rigid systems. But Stalin negotiated firmly at Potsdam and, despite not having the bomb, lost none of the Allied concessions over Poland & Eastern Europe agreed at Yalta.

The Cold War

The Western powers accepted the de facto extension of Soviet Power over Eastern Europe and the Cold War began. Stalin felt more vulnerable than ever as a result of the fact that the Russian economy was exhausted and competition with the West on economic terms was impossible. This meant that the USSR would have to withdraw behind its defensive barrier. Berlin was felt to be an anomaly and in 1948 Stalin ordered the blockade of West Berlin. In 1947 the US initiated the Marshall Plan offering large amounts of capital to Europe for reconstruction. The Soviets refused to participate on the grounds that it was Western imperialism. In 1947 Britain withdrew its guarantees from Greece and Turkey, but the USA offered to take up the role and announced the Truman doctrine [The doctrine announced by President Truman to the American Congress in March 1947 stating that America would assist “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” thus signalling that America would resist attempts by the Soviet Union to extend its sphere of influence]. Stalin was tempted by the offer of Marshall aid, but decided he did not want to become dependent on the USA. Formation of NATO in 1949 increased distrust of the USSR. The USSR chose to build its own military alliance in Europe. Contacts at the UN did not ease confrontation between the US and the USSR. In both the General Assembly or in the Security Committee there was point-scoring. In 1949 the Soviets advocated recognition of Mao's government. Failing to get this, the Soviet Union staged a walk out. As a result, the USA was able to get a resolution to defend South Korea passed by the Security Council. Thus Stalin had for a long time ceased to follow a policy of an international Marxist revolution. He always feared a Western invasion. There was distrust on both sides.