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The Moral Argument for the Existence of God

I
God as a Postulate of Practical Reason
From Kant: Critique of Practical Reason

The Existence of God as a Postulate of Practical Reason
... In the foregoing analysis the moral law led to a practical problem which is dictated by pure reason alone, without the aid of any egocentric motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the first and principle element of the summum bonum [1]; that is to say, Morality. It is shown there that this can be only finally solved by recourse to the concept of eternity, and specifically to the postulate of immortality.

The same moral law now leads us also to affirm a second element in the summum bonum, which is that happiness should be proportionate to morality. This is affirmed by a line of reasoning that is as disinterested and unaffected by egocentric considerations as before; that is, it follows from impartial reason. This also leads us to conclude that there must exist a cause of the summum bonum that is capable of bringing it to completion; in other words, we must postulate the existence of God, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum. God is an entity endowed with will who is capable of producing the summum bonum, which is a moral law based on pure reason alone. We proceed to exhibit this connection in a more detailed and convincing way.

A person endowed with reason is happy in this world when whatever he wishes comes to pass. For a happy person in this sense there is a natural harmony between his wishes and the whole course of nature; whatever causes him to will something, that is, his desire, is also in harmony with course of nature. On the other hand, the moral law is a law governing free beings, that is, beings not determined or constrained by any law of nature. Moral law is quite independent of any natural law and likewise quite independent of any fortuitous harmony between a man's desire and nature. The actions that a person living according to reason takes are not the cause of the world or of any natural law. There is no necessary connection between moral behaviour on the one hand and the principle that happiness should be proportionate to morality. As far as the world and nature are concerned, there is no necessary reason why a person acting morally should be happy. A moral man cannot by the mere exercise of his will make nature conform to this principle. He cannot will it that whatever he wishes should come to pass.

Nonetheless, pure reason dictates that in any practical application of the moral law the agent must do what is right, and hence endeavour to promote the summum bonum. This being the case, it must be possible to attain the summum bonum. Thus, we must postulate existence a cause of all nature that is separate from nature itself and contains within itself the power to bring about the summum bonum. Furthermore, this supreme cause of the world must have the power to bring nature into harmony with the moral law, whenever rational beings, in full knowledge of this law, make the law the supreme determining principle of their conduct, and act not only outwardly in accordance with the moral imperative, but also choose to act from pure motives in accordance with their established moral character. It follows from this that the attainment of the summum bonum is only possible in this world on the supposition that there exists a supreme Being who has a power to bring about the desires of a moral person acting from pure motives. In addition, such a being that is capable of acting in accordance with laws must be an intelligent and rational being, and he must act according to these laws because he chooses to do so — it accords with his will. So it follows from consideration of what the summum bonum is, that the supreme cause of all nature must be conceived as a being endowed with intelligence and will, and that means, that this supreme cause must be God. In this way we see that to acknowledge the existence of a best world (the highest derived good) is equivalent to postulating the existence of God, who is the highest original good. It is our duty to promote the summum bonum; it is a prerequisite of this duty to suppose that the summum bonum is possible; on supposing this, the possibility of the summum bonum is only acceptable on the supposition that there exists a God, for the existence of God is inseparably connected with the duty to promote the summum bonum. In conclusion, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.

1. Summon bonum is Latin for “the highest good” also meaning here, “the best of all possible worlds”. In any moral situation the agent has the duty to promote the best of all possible worlds. But Kant asks, how can this be if the best of all possible worlds is not possible?

II

1 There is a duty to work for the completion of the summum bonum, that is, the best of all possible worlds. The essence of any duty is to act in any given situation in the best possible way.
2But a duty cannot be a duty if it is impossible to perform it. It would be immoral to command someone to do something that was not possible. The summum bonum also encompasses the principle that happiness should be proportionate to morality. Happiness is the reward of a good action, and a duty cannot be a duty if it is not rewarde
3 Therefore, there must be a power that makes it possible to perform any duty.
4 In performing any duty, acting without egocentric motives, that is from pure motives, it must be true that a better world is created.
5 There is no natural law that makes it necessary that what a good man wishes should come to pass.
6 Thus, since it is necessary that the actions of a good man should perfect the world, it follows that there must be a power that brings about this necessary connection.
7 Since that power acts in accordance with the rational principle of the summum bonum, that power must be both intelligent and endowed with will.
8 Hence, there exists a benevolent, intelligent power that is the originator of the world and all nature; that is, God exists.

III

Kant believes in the existence of an objective moral reality which dictates through our conscience what our duty is at any given time. This means that a moral obligation is a statement about the real world. Moral commands, which are communicated through our conscience, are imperatives that oblige you to act without regard to foreseeable material consequences. From the material point of view there is no necessity why the world should be a place where moral actions always succeed, and where they are always rewarded by happiness.
But how could a moral reality be moral if it commanded you to act in ways that did not produce happiness? Our conscience equally provides us with the moral intuition that good actions should be rewarded. Would the command to act morally be moral if there was no reward?
That is to say, if there is an objective moral reality, then there must be a power, call it God, capable of rewarding good actions with happiness. Since material reality does not necessarily have to follow this law, the reward for goodness must transcend appearances. In other words, there must be a providence that is operative behind appearances. So in apprehending that an action is the dictate of an objective moral reality, you apprehend also the existence of God and the existence of a reality that transcends appearances. We might call that transcendent reality eternity or heaven.
This argument is open to practical objections. Firstly, how to you know what the dictates of your conscience are? In reply, Kant would claim that to act morally is to act in accordance with what he calls the categorical imperative, which is the dictum do unto others as you would be done by. If this is the case, then you do always know what the dictate of your conscience is. However, his argument is premised only on the claim that morality is objective, and that this objectivity entails the principle that happiness should be proportionate to morality. It is not premised on Kant's particular conception of the moral law as a duty to do unto others as you would be done by. So it is possible to accept the moral argument for the existence of God solely on the premise that your conscience dictates to you at any given time what the best possible course of action is. The reply in this case is simply to insist on morality as a matter of sincerity. In order to act morally you do have to question your motives. So people do have to be aware that what they take to be the dictates of their conscience are very often thoughts contaminated by other forces at work in human nature, such as egocentric desires.
Secondly, there is also the charge that can be levied against Kant of what we might call “spiritual materialism”. By this is meant the charge that because God rewards all moral actions, the actions are chosen for the reward and not because they are moral. However, there is a reply to this objection that also exposes the core of the argument. For this argument rests on faith and not on reason. It is an argument that pursues the consequences of a religious experience of the moral law. When commanded by our conscience to act in a certain way, we do not know that that there is an objective moral reality. Rather, we have to take it on faith that there is such a reality. It is always possible to deny that the dictates of conscience are dictates in accordance with an objective moral law. Faced with a difficult decision, where the moral action is hard in comparison to one which is easier, we may always choose to abandon the moral action on the assumption that there is no objective imperative to act in accordance with it, and hence, that there is no God. The reward of heaven is by no means certain, and it requires an effort of the will to have faith in it. If we lived in a world where all was certain there would be no need for faith.
In order to clarify this point it may be appropriate to contrast it with another conception of the objectivity of morality — specifically that offered by G.E. Moore in his Principia Ethica. In this work G.E. Moore claims that we are endowed with a moral intuition that enables us to directly intuit various forms of intrinsic values — these values are objective, and independent of human nature. There is no mention of God in this conception. The moral reality of intrinsic values is objective and independent of human nature. This is objective moral reality without God.
The question must be, is the removal of God from the picture permissible? In a technical sense it might be. Moore pictures “goodness” as a quality in much the same way that “yellow” is a quality. He calls both “simple notions”, and they attach to objects in much the same way, as properties attach to subjects. However, such a notion of what is intrinsically valuable cannot supply an imperative. It is rather aesthetic and contemplative in character, and not practical. In so far as no action is required, the contemplation of the value of a beautiful work of art, or of a sublime view of a mountain, impels no necessary connection with a power that ensures that happiness is proportionate to morality. But as soon as the experience of an intrinsic value results in an imperative, then a conflict between what is good and what is good for me can arise. In such a case, where is the imperative if on choosing what is good for me in preference to what is good there are no consequences? The world carries on according to the laws of nature — I have denied what is objective, but no practical outcome ensues! I am not denied heaven by this selfish action. (Indeed, there is no heaven to be denied.) This is not an imperative! Hence, if a dictate of conscience is an imperative — a thou shalt do this and nothing else, then it leads you back into the moral argument for the existence of God. The imperative commands, therefore there must be a power that commands. The imperative impels you to act in ways that are contrary to your immediate advantage, therefore, there must be a promise in this imperative, not certain, but to be taken on trust, that is, as an act of faith, that action in accordance with this imperative will be rewarded in eternity. And so forth.
In short, G.E. Moore's attempt to create an objective moral reality without God does not work. It has no practical applications. If morality was an aesthetic activity like contemplating a work of art, it might work; but morality is not like that. Morality is about acting morally, and it implies the possibility of conflict between different courses of action. As Kant puts it, God is the postulate of pure, practical reason.
In conclusion, the moral argument claims that the experience of the objectivity of the dictates of conscience obliges one to accept that there must also be a God who is the author of those dictates and who will ensure that happiness will be proportionate to morality, either through the operation of his will on earth through providence, or through the reward of heaven. This argument rests on faith rather than reason. Since it is by no means certain that morality is objective, it follows that to believe that it is objective, and hence that the dictates of conscience must always be followed, is to have faith. That faith is shown by the moral argument for the existence of God to be equivalent to a belief in God. Therefore, the moral argument is an articulation of the experience of faith in God's existence and the intimate connection between God's will and morality.

IV

Sigmund Freud argued that what we call conscience is the product of conditioning. He argued that through childhood we learn to internalize the rules of conduct inculcated into us by our parents. These rules of conduct become an unconscious force at work in our nature, and functions as an almost separate identity within us, so we may call it the superego.
The long period of childhood, during which the growing human lives in dependence on its parents, leaves behind it ... the formation in his ego of a special agency in which the parental influence is prolonged. It has received the name of superego. [Freud: New Introductory Lectures.]
Or, in other words, what we call conscience is merely the result of psychological forces at work in us, and in particular, the result of conditioning.
This is not really an objection to the moral argument. The moral argument starts with the assumption that the moral law is objective, which means, it is not the product of mere conditioning, or the work of merely psychological forces. Conscience is a form of perception, connecting the perceiving self with another world of objective moral truth.
Every individual is aware that in any morally difficult situation there will be many temptations not to act in accordance with conscience. If what we call our conscience is no more than the product of psychological conditioning, there is no objective reason to abide by it. In determining that a moral command — the dictate of one's conscience — is an imperative — one asserts that that command is objective — that is proceeds from something more than mere conditioning. Freud does not prove that our conscience is nothing more than the internalized critical voices of our parents. There could be no proof of such a thing. In effect his views confirm that to believe in God is a matter of faith, and it is always possible to abandon that faith for some other explanation of our experience. The guilty feeling one feels on disregarding the dictates of one's conscience can be explained away. It is for each individual to decide for him or herself whether to follow that explanation. If you accept that the dictates of conscience proceed from the perception of an objective moral truth, then the moral argument for the existence of God may force you to accept that God is the author of that objective morality.
Note, also, that the moral argument for the existence of God is premised primarily on the idea that what we take to be the dictates of conscience are perceptions of objective moral truth. No particular interpretation of that moral law, Kantian or otherwise, is required for the moral argument for the existence of God to be compelling. This is mentioned because Kant's interpretation of moral law is particularly austere (and hence unlivable) and one would not wish to associate the moral argument exclusively with his conception of what moral existence is.