Appeasement: European Relations, 1936 - 39

Spanish Civil War

The summer of 1936 saw the beginning of the Spanish civil war. The early 1936 general election in Spain gave a majority to a Left-wing coalition — the 'Popular front'. Spanish generals in charge of the regular army, under General Franco, rebelled against this civilian authority on 16th July and started to march on Madrid. The Popular front organised stiffer than expected resistance, and a civil war ensued. The Germans and Italians sent military aid to Franco, and later, the Soviets started sending military aid, though to a lesser extent, to the republicans. Opinion in Britain and France was divided on what to do. There was no general commitment to the idea that the democratically elected government should be able to govern. In France, the recently elected Popular Front, was reluctant to intervene for fear of setting off a civil war in France, and the British government inclined to Franco's side. Britain and France proposed that no other power should intervene in Spain, and set up a committee in London to administer this. However, whilst agreeing to this, Germany and Italy openly flouted the agreement, and Soviet Russia soon followed. Italy sent 100,000 men to Spain in all. In Britain, once the policy of non-intervention was clearly not working, the Labour party swung in favour of intervention. Although Britain did not intervene formally, a number of British men volunteered to fight for the Republic; 2,000 British citizens fought in Spain, and 500 died, many of them unemployed miners.

Chamberlain and the Philosophy of Appeasement

During 1936 Britain started to rearm. Arms expenditure increased to £159 million, which was not in itself a large amount, but the reversal of the trend towards disarmament was significant. The decision to rearm was taken in the autumn of 1935. The armaments programme was not met by ordinary taxation and Britain shifted towards a war economy. Unrestricted aircraft production was authorized from 22nd February 1939.

However, British Prime Minister Chamberlain regarded the expenditure on armaments as a waste of resources better diverted towards “domestic reform”, and he thought that Hitler and Mussolini were rational. He accepted that Germany would dominate in Easter Europe and the Balkans. He probably hoped that there would be a balance of power between Germany and Russia. Like the British public in general, he probably regarded Soviet Russia with as much distrust as Germany. He could not count on Soviet Russia militarily, since the army hierarchy in Soviet Russia had just been purged. It was expected that, whilst Russia would seek to communise Europe, Germany would, if her grievances were addressed, become a stable, prosperous and happy member of Europe.

The British viewed foreign policy from a moral rather than a practical point of view, though this may be based on the common assumption that Britain was still a world power. English people believed that Germans had a moral argument for equality in armaments, and that German nationals were entitled to join a greater Germany. The Conservatives took this line. The editor of The Times, Dawson, was adamant that Germany's grievances should be redressed. Against this, however, it was recognised that Germany was no longer a democratic, but a totalitarian, state, and that nasty things were happening within Germany. English people were offended by the German treatment of the Jews, although Jews were treated equally badly in some countries, such as Poland, with whom they remained in alliance, and there was some anti-Semitism within England too. The fall of Germany from civilisation to barbarism offended English public opinion. In addition, German Jews were not poor, and those Jews that could afford to emigrate to Britain were warmly received. City bankers were offended when a Rothschild was imprisoned; and when Austria was incorporated into Germany, Sigmund Freud was also admitted to Britain. A.J.P. Taylor comments that “Nazi treatment of the Jews did more than anything else to turn English moral feeling against Germany, and this moral feeling in turn made English people less reluctant to go to war.”

Chamberlain believed that appeasement would civilise the Germans, and he was backed in this by the leaders of the Dominions after an Imperial conference of May 1937. Australia and New Zealand wanted an increase of British power in the Far East in order to counter the growing threat from Japan. Within the cabinet Chamberlain was supported by the former foreign secretaries, Simon and Hoare, and by Halifax as lord president of the council; only Eden, and some junior ministers, were opposed to the policy. Eden had not opposed the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, nor the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland, but after the summer of 1937 when 'unknown' submarines, actually Italian, sank British and French ships bound for Spain, he adopted a more hawkish stance. There was a new appeal for help from the Chinese in November 1937 to the League, which referred the matter to a conference of Nine Powers at Brussels. The British said they would support any action taken by the United States, which decided to take no action. However, in January 1938 the Americans signalled that they would welcome an international conference to discuss every grievance. At the time, Eden was on holiday, and Chamberlain, who planned to negotiate directly with Hitler and Mussolini through the emissary of Halifax, decided to discourage the American initiative. The Americans were happy to be relieved of any commitment, but Eden was angry at the missed opportunity to involve them, once he returned from holiday.

The Anschluss

The next stage of the crisis arose as Austria's independence was threatened by Hitler's Germany. Chamberlain believed that an alliance with Mussolini would enable the threat to the independence of Austria to be countered. Mussolini made de jure recognition of the Italian empire in Abyssinia a condition. Chamberlain was ready to agree to this, provided Italian troops were withdrawn from Spain. Eden objected to the line of conciliation taken with Mussolini, but Chamberlain was supported by the entire cabinet. Eden resigned on 20th February, and Halifax took over as foreign secretary. After the debate over Eden's resignation, twenty-five Conservative MPs abstained in the vote, thus signalling the end of unanimous support for the government for the policy of appeasement.

The progress of German aggression continued unabated, and on 13th March 1938 Austria was incorporated into Germany (The Anschluss, meaning, “political union”), and Hitler entered Vienna in triumph. Churchill spoke in the house of commons saying that Europe was 'confronted with a programme of aggression, nicely calculated and timed, unfolding stage by stage.'

The Munich Crisis

Now the Czechoslovakian crisis ensued. However, Chamberlain again did not regard the independence of Czechoslovakia as of vital concern to Britain, and disapproved of Czechoslovakian alliances with France and Soviet Russia. Additionally, he accepted that the 3 million Germans that resided within the Czechoslovakian borders had a right to rejoin Germany. This was the general view of most politically aware Englishmen, especially on the Left, and it was also generally accepted that Britain did not have the capacity to intervene from a military point-of-view to assist Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain and the foreign office took the initiative and sought to extract from Czechoslovakia concessions that would appease Hitler in advance of German military action. The French were also willing to back away from its stance of unreserved support for Czechoslovakia. However, the Czechs did not cooperate in spirit, and both President Benes for Czechoslovakia and the Czech Germans aimed only to discredit each other in the negotiations, rather than arrive at a genuine agreement. On 4th September Benes agreed to the German Czech demands, knowing that these would not now satisfy them; on 13th September there was an attempted revolt by German Czechs, which was easily suppressed by the Czechs.

Chamberlain flew to Munich on 15th September, accompanied by Sir Horace Wilson, and offered to partition Czechoslovakia, to which Hitler agreed, however suspecting that Chamberlain would not be able to deliver. The French prime minister, Daladier, met with Chamberlain in London on 18th September, and argued that Hitler was bent on European domination; Chamberlain was forced by the strength of this argument to guarantee the borders of the truncated Czechoslovakia. With the support of Halifax, Simon and Hoare, he gave this guarantee without consulting the cabinet. Benes was forced to accept the agreement on 21st September, when Britain and France delivered him an ultimatum that they would not support him otherwise. Chamberlain again flew to Germany on 22nd September, when Hitler made the further demand of immediate occupation of the Sudeten, where the German Czechs lived. The issue of Polish and Hungarian minorities would also have to be settled. The Czech representatives, who were made to wait in the lobby, were then told they had to accept the deal unconditionally and without delay. Chamberlain and Hitler signed a statement the next day which read: 'We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.' On arriving in England, Chamberlain waved this piece of paper, saying, 'I've got it.' He made an appearance from a window of 10 Downing Street, and addressed a cheering crowd with these words, 'This is the second time that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time.' The press supported the Munich agreement as better than war, but the first lord of the admiralty, Duff Cooper, resigned on the grounds that Britain should have fought a war to prevent one country using brute force to dominate another. However, public opinion supported Chamberlain, and the governments of the Dominions also endorsed the agreement. At this time Canada, South Africa and Eire would have probably refused to go to war, and Britain would have had only the reluctant support of Australia and New Zealand. In the commons Chamberlain did not try to offer any moral arguments in favour of the policy — it was based merely on the expedient that Britain was not militarily able to fight a war. However, Hitler also made no moral arguments in defence of his annexation of the Sudeten, and presented it as a victory for German might to the German people; he also did not treat the Czechs fairly.

After the Munich crisis opponents of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement were strengthened and formed a Popular Front. However, Chamberlain and Halifax continued to labour strenuously for the policy of appeasement, and they visited Mussolini in the expectation that Mussolini would be able to moderate Hitler. They rewarded Mussolini by recognising Franco as the ruler of Spain. But after November 1938 Hitler launched a further pogrom against the Jews, and this upset British public opinion. However, the government continued to believe in their foreign policy, and Hoare told his constituency that a new Golden Age was approaching.

Dismemberment of Czechoslovakia

On March 15th 1939 Czechoslovakia was dismembered. Slovakia became an independent state, Hungary took the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, and the Czech state became a German 'protectorate', governed by the German dictatorship, including the Gestapo. From this point British political and public opinion was decidedly turned against Hitler. Taking over Czechoslovakia was regarded as an act of pre-meditated aggression. The government, however, sought to whitewash the whole affair. Chamberlain spoke ambiguously in the House of Commons to the effect that the end of Czechoslovakia may not have been premeditated, and Simon argued that a guarantee to a country that no longer existed could not be fulfilled. But Chamberlain was forced by public opinion into a tougher stance, and signalled an end to appeasement with the words, 'Any attempt to dominate the world by force was one which the Democracies must resist'.

Another scare emerged when a Romanian, Tilea, stated on 16th March, 1939 that his country was about to be invaded. In fact, the Germans had no such plan, but Chamberlain, in response, organised a joint statement of resistance to be signed by the French, Polish and Soviet governments in addition to the British. However, the agreement collapsed as the Soviets were not prepared to sign unless the Polish signed, and the Polish were not prepared to sign and so signal a decision between Russia and Germany. The Polish believed that their independent, secret negotiations with Germany over Danzig would save them. The British believed that Poland was slipping into the German camp, and on 31st March Chamberlain wrote to them promising British support if their independence was threatened. The Polish premier, Beck, accepted the British offer of support, insisting, in fact, on a mutual alliance between equal powers. However, the British were reluctant to put their words into practice, and they stalled over negotiations to provide the Poles with financial aid, and did not send any British munitions to Poland prior to the outbreak of war. The alliance was only formally concluded on 25th August, which was less than a week before the outbreak of the war. Hitler used the alliance between England and Poland as a pretext for repudiating his non-aggression pact with Poland on 28th April, and the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact

Negotiations between Britain and Russia were opened from 15th April. In this first stage, which lasted until 14th May, the British asked the Soviets for a one-sided commitment of support should the need arise. The Soviets demanded a reciprocal commitment from Britain, which the British were not prepared to offer. Nonetheless, the French pushed the British for a further initiative and between 27th May and 23rd July a second phase of negotiations saw the British trying to work out a formula that would give the soviets a “straight alliance” but prevent them from taking an initiative. These negotiations did not produce anything, and at Molotov's suggestion, the negotiators tried looking at military plans in the hope that work on detail would break the deadlock. The military talks lasted from 12th to 21st August. The Soviets asked on 14th August whether they could move their army into North Poland in order to make contact with the enemy, and were told “no” by the Poles. On 21st August the military talks broke down.

In fact, Chamberlain was still pursuing the policy of appeasement. When Halifax was invited to Moscow he declined, and Chamberlain even denied that the Russians had made the offer when questioned in the house. Chamberlain declined Eden's offer to visit Moscow as a special emissary. He was expecting Germany to become more moderate, and the show of resistance was only a policy designed to push Hitler into moderation. He offered Hitler an Anglo-German economic partnership, colonial concessions and a loan of £1bn.

On 21st August it emerged that Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, had been invited to Moscow and on 23rd August Ribbentrop and Molotov signed the Nazi-Soviet pact in which Soviet Russia agreed to remain neutral should Germany be involved in war, and also effectively agreed to partition Poland. The pact caused a further firming up of political opinion in Britain; Conservatives who were inclined to support Hitler now swung against him, and Labour swung against Soviet Russia.

The Invasion of Poland

The French almost abandoned their alliance with Poland, but the British announced on 22nd August that their policy towards Poland would not change, and parliament passed an Emergency Powers Act on 24th August, and the Anglo-Polish treaty of mutual assistance was signed on the 25th. Chamberlain and Halifax engaged a Swedish businessman to negotiate with Hitler, but Hitler rejected further offers after the conclusion of the Anglo-Polish treaty. Halifax sought to persuade the Polish premiere, Beck, to negotiate with Hitler, but Beck refused and the Germans launched their attack on Poland on 1st September. On the 2nd September, in response, Mussolini and the French were about to propose a conference, but the British insisted that German troops were withdrawn from Poland first. However, during the debate in the house of commons on the evening of 2nd September, Chamberlain still entertained the prospect of a conference to settle everything. The house greeted this declaration with hostility, and conservative Amery shouted to the acting Labour leader, Arthur Greenwood, as he rose, to 'Speak for England, Arthur!' After the conclusion of the debate Greenwood told Chamberlain in private that 'it would be impossible to hold the House'. Simon met with some ministers and carried to Chamberlain a message that war must be declared immediately. At the cabinet meeting at 11 p.m. some ministers stated that they would not leave until an immediate ultimatum was sent, and Chamberlain reluctantly agreed. The British ultimatum was delivered to the German government at 9.00 a.m. on 3rd September, 1939; the Germans allowed the deadline of 11.00 a.m. to pass without reply. The British declaration automatically brought in India. The governments of Australia and New Zealand also declared war on Germany without consulting parliament. The Canadian government declared war on 10th September after a parliamentary debate. The South African prime minister, Herzog, wanted to remain neutral, but the South African parliament voted for war by 80 to 67, and the governor refused Herzog a dissolution of parliament, and Smuts became prime minister. Eire declared herself neutral.

The Phoney War

There then ensued the 'phoney war'. Neither side attacked the other. The British did not institute aerial bombardment of Germany, and declared itself morally against unrestricted air-warfare. The RAF attempted to bomb the German fleet, without success and then dropped propaganda leaflets. Germany offered peace after the conquest of Poland, but this was formally rejected by both houses. The British Expeditionary Force was placed under the command of the French forces, under Gamelin. The French made some ineffectual crossings into Germany whilst Poland was being invaded. The British made some ineffectual fortifications on the border with Belgium.

The British and French had vague military plans. They aimed to build up their forces leisurely and attack Italy. However, Mussolini declared that he was 'non-belligerent' and the Allies forgot their plans. The cabinet believed that Germany was economically weak, which was completely misguided. There was, additionally, no effective blockade since Germany was able to import through Italy and Russia. In fact, it was the British who faced economic difficulties. The Admiralty's device against U boats, Asdic, was ineffective, and the German submarines did extensive damage to shipping. The aircraft carrier Courageous was sunk, and the defences of Scapa Flaw were breached and the battleship Royal Oak was sunk. Meanwhile, the German pocket battleship Graf Spee did extensive damage in the South Atlantic. However, it was hunted down by British battleships and had to be scuttled. Furthermore, the magnetic mine was responsible for 800,000 tons of lost merchant shipping by the end of the year. Although the British did have more shipping by the end of the year, the introduction of the convoy system reduced carrying capacity. The treasury limited purchases in the United States, and so supplies had to be brought from further afield. The target of 38 million tons from British ships alone proved to be unrealistic, and all-in-all Britain was not prepared for war.

Russo-Finish War

At this time the Baltic states acceded to a demand from the Soviets to accept military control. Finland refused and was invaded by Soviet Russia. But the Finish resisted and actually defeated the Soviets. The British and French began to assemble an expeditionary force of 100,000 men. Churchill proposed that the expeditionary force would take Narvik in Norway and thus cut off German supplies of iron ore. The preparations were inadequate. The British and French requested passage through Norway and Sweden, but were refused. Finland made peace with Soviet Russia on 12th March, acceding to Soviet demands, and the British and French were humiliated. In France the government of Daladier fell. It was replaced by a government under Reynauld, which was politically weak. The French pressed for action over Norway, and Churchill also agreed with them.

Invasion of Denmark and Norway

The expeditionary force was reassembled, but before it could be sent into action the Germans invaded Denmark, on 8th April, and took over every Norwegian port from Oslo to Narvik. The Norwegians called for assistance, and the British tried to respond. However, they discovered that they could not operate within the range of German air cover, and that their troops were only half-trained and unable to make a forced landing. In other words, Britain lacked the military capacity to assist Norway. However, Narvik was captured on 28th May. But by this time the demand on the British navy was too great to sustain. It was evacuated on 8th June, with the loss of the aircraft-carrier Glorious and two destroyers. However, the operation was not entirely a disaster. The British gained 1 million tons of Norwegian shipping, the Norwegian government in exile moved to Britain, and the German fleet was damaged, losing three cruisers, ten destroyers and sustaining temporary damage to much of its remaining fleet. This was indirectly responsible for the successful British evacuation of Dunkirk.

The Invasion of France - Churchill becomes British Prime Minister

The British people were enraged against Chamberlain, and became enthusiastic for Churchill. In the house of commons, Amery once again spoke decisively, quoting Cromwell's words to the Rump, 'Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!' Chamberlain invited the Labour leaders, Atlee and Greenwood to join the government. They said they would not serve under him, but declined to say whether they would serve under someone else. During the night of 9th May the Germans invaded Holland and Belgium. On the afternoon of the 10th Labour indicated that they would serve under a new prime minister. Churchill became prime minister at 6 p.m. on the 10th May, 1940.

The house met on 13 May. Churchill said: 'I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat. You ask, What is our policy? I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land, and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us. . . . You ask, What is our aim? I can answer in one word: Victory — victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be.'