Introduction to Meta-ethics

Ethics, also known as first order ethics, is concerned with constructing a theory or set of rules regarding “how to live well”. An example of an ethical theory is that offered by Plato, who tells us that a good life is one in which an individual seeks to sublimate lower appetitive urges and channel his psychic energy towards the contemplation of the “Form of the Good.” Another example is Aristotle's first order ethical theory which is similar to Plato's in that Aristotle advocates that we should lead the life of reason. The difference between his theory and that of Plato is that in Aristotle's view there is no absolute obligation to seek an out of body existence. Another ethical theory, lying at the other end of the spectrum of theories, is orgiastic hedonism, which claims that the immediate seeking of sensual pleasure as the only good thing.

Meta-ethics, also called second order ethics, is concerned with questions of how we know how to act. In other words, it is concerned with what it is about the human mind and its faculties that enables it to establish which first-order ethical system is correct. Meta-ethics bridges the gap between first-order ethics on the one hand and metaphysics on the other. For example, in Plato's meta-ethics we are told that we exist in a fallen state, that to be fallen is to have been overwhelmed by appetitive urges, and that there is a Form of the Good that we can know through contemplation. It is this meta-ethics that lends support to Plato's first-order ethics.

However, there is a general attack on the whole use of meta-ethics deriving from Hume. In his Treatise Hume argues that there is a fact/value gap (also called an “is/ought gap”). What he means by this is that a fact, such as “Jones promised to pay Guy £5”, does not entail a value, such as “Jones ought to pay Guy £5”. There is a gap from a statement of one type to a statement of the other, which can only be bridged if a moral premise is introduced, such as “Jones ought to keep his promises”. Thus, from a fact alone, it is not possible to deduce a value; you require a value to start with. This fact/value gap is an important critical tool that is actually essential in day-to-day practical applications of principles. Since people so often seek to impose their values on others by disguising them as facts or as inferences from facts, keeping facts and values clearly and distinctly apart is part of the nuts-and-bolts of moral health and independence.

However, whilst Hume would welcome this as an application of the fact/value gap, his main intention in introducing it is to attack the kind of reasoning that Plato exemplifies. Hume specifically states that the inference from “There is a God” (fact) to “Therefore, I ought to ... ” (value) is a fallacy. In this way Hume seeks to persuade us that “speculative metaphysics” is useless as a guide to moral conduct. He states that even if we could prove that there was a God we would not be able to infer a code of conduct from his existence. This is also expressed in the paradox that if we should obey God because what he commands is moral, then the obedience to God is strictly irrelevant, since what we should obey is what is moral, which God just happens to command. If, on the other hand, God commands something that is not moral, then we are not obligated to obey him. Either way, it would appear that the existence of God and what he commands is irrelevant to the ethical situation. Since religious people believe that the existence of God, and the obedience to his commands, is essential to ethics, this paradox poses a severe problem to them.

However, there are replies to Hume, even if his fact/value gap is very popular in our present age of materialism. What Hume would not acknowledge is that there are moral facts. For Hume the only factual statements (statements about what is) are statements about empirical objects and their properties. Because he adopts a proto-form of verificationism, he would not acknowledge that a statement like “God exists” is factual and meaningful. The reply to this is to point out the irony that Hume has not excluded metaphysics from his philosophy because his denial of the existence of a supra-sensible realm of moral fact is itself a metaphysics with momentous implications. Furthermore, he is not able to establish the objective truth of his metaphysics. Yet he derives from this, and its meta-ethical implications, conclusions about ethics. In this way, he commits his own fact/value fallacy. He argues: fact: Man is a mechanism; fact: man can only derive his moral sentiments from his subjective feelings; fact our moral sentiments associate what is good with what is useful; fact: a life of virtue maximizes utility to society. Therefore, value: We should adopt actions that benefit society as a whole. This is a similar pattern of argument to that offered by Plato. Both Hume and Plato seek to advocate a form of ethical conduct by showing us that this follows from facts about our metaphysical condition.

In the case of a value there may be no distinction between a fact and a value. For example, to say that something is good is to assert both a fact and a value. This approach has been adopted by G.E. Moore. He claims that “good” is a simple notion, like “yellow”. This view is called ethical intuitionism. If we follow this line of argument we can offer a possible solution to the apparent paradox described above that sought to show us that the existence of God is irrelevant to morality, and therefore, altogether irrelevant. The paradox draws a distinction between God (a being endowed with will) and morality (the good) and it is this distinction that is arguably false. The existence of God as a fact is not separable from the existence of value. This might be expressed by saying God is love — God (entity) is love (value) — no distinction between fact and value.

By way of digression, if we follow this line of thinking further, we will trace the genesis and evolution of Christian theology. In Plato, the highest being is the Form of the Good. In his later theology, Plato claims that the world was fashioned out of prime matter by a demi-urge who made the visible world in the likeness of the Form of the Good. Thus, the absolute, one God (which is an expression of monotheism), who is the Form of the Good, divides himself into two aspects — the absolute morality (also the Form of the Good) and the creator (demi-urge) who impels unformed matter through time towards its ultimate perfection. This is a prototype of the distinction in Christian theology between God the Father (logos) and God the Holy Spirit (who “moves on the waters”.) The Trinity is completed by the inclusion of God the Son, who redeems creation by his own sacrifice.

Ethical intuitionism (also called ethical naturalism) as advocated by G.E. Moore, is also an example of a consequentialist meta-ethical theory. A consequentialist derives notions of what is right or wrong from what is good or bad. For example, the right thing to do is the action which maximizes the good. G.E. Moore is an example of an ethical pluralist too, since he states that there are many good things which are good, which have intrinsic value. Another example of a consequentialist ethics is utilitarianism, which states that the only good thing is pleasure and the only bad thing is pain. It follows that the right action is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.

In contrast to consequentialism, a meta-ethics in which what is good is derived from what is right is called a deontological theory. The principal example of a deontologist is Kant, who advocates a system of life based on what he calls the categorical imperative, which in a simple form may be stated as the rule, “Do unto others as you would be done by”.

The dispute between deontology and consequentialism is an example of a meta-ethical debate. The other principle example is the debate between objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivists believe that there is a moral reality existing independently of the subjective perceiving self. Subjectivists believe that there is no moral reality and values are an expression of moral feelings only. Another meta-ethical debate is whether values are absolute or relative. Absolute values would be values that apply to all situations and to all people. An example of a belief of this kind was the belief in the medieval ages that suicide was absolutely immoral. Moral relativism, in opposition to this, argues that values are relative to the situation. Moral relativism is currently more fashionable and we tend to think that even suicide can be justified in certain circumstances.

In summary, ethics is concerned with what is right and wrong, and with what is good and bad. Meta-ethics is concerned with explaining how our ethical sentiments arise from metaphysical “facts” about the nature of our existence. Examples of complete meta-ethical systems are those of Plato and Hume. Plato seeks to enlighten our understanding of morality by showing us that we are fallen beings. Hume seeks to enlighten our understanding of morality by showing us that we are information processing machines.

Examples of meta-ethical debates are (1) debate about the fact/value gap; (2) debate over consequentialist and deontological theories; (3) debate over subjectivism and objectivism; (4) debate over whether values are absolute or relative.