Aristotle — The Nicomachean Ethics

Introduction

There are two problems with the text of The Nicomachean Ethics. (1) The text is made up of a series of notes probably originally compiled by a student or students of Aristotle attending one of his lecture courses. Thus, the Nicomachean Ethics was not actually written by Aristotle, though obviously it reflects his thinking. These written up notes reflect the incoherence of notes, and the lecture course may also have been unsystematic. The text is frequently obscure and repetitive. (2) There are unresolved tensions and arguably inconsistencies in Aristotle's work.

For these reasons, what is offered here is a systematic reconstruction of Aristotle's views on ethics rather than an exposition closely following the text.

1. Aristotle's Method of Enquiry

Aristotle is living a long time before the more modern period of philosophy initiated by Descartes. It is not surprising, then, that he does not subscribe to the Cartesian notion of working from first principles. For Aristotle the starting point in any enquiry is an examination of the opinions and beliefs of the scholars who have preceded him. He tends to think that everyone who has though seriously about a subject has some truth to express, and his task is to analyse what is inadequate in each opinion, weigh up counter-claims, and so arrive at distilled doctrine that encompasses as much of the wisdom of the past as possible. It is a methodology in which one takes the best of all the rival theories, so it could be described as eclectic.

He frequently includes quotations from other philosophers, and almost every discussion he initiates on a given topic is preceded by a gathering up of currently held beliefs and by an analysis of them. This is another reason why his writing becomes repetitive. Having distilled the “correct' view, Aristotle then attempts to re-express it and given it a place within the context of the other doctrines he has advanced in his work. Aristotle's method might also be said to be paradigmatic since it seeks to distil the truth from a series of examples (or paradigms). In some respects, Aristotle's methodology is a fore-runner of the modern methodology called “common-sense' philosophy.[i]

Another aspect of Aristotle's method of enquiry concerns his use of the distinction between genus and species. This distinction was introduced into Western culture by Plato, but Aristotle used it systematically to classify, for example, the different types of animal, thus inventing the science of Biology. Aristotle always thinks it is appropriate to classify a given subject in relation to other subjects. At VI, iii he claims that there are five ways in which the soul arrives at truth, which are art, science, prudence, wisdom and intuition. He discusses each of these methods, and concludes that the study of ethics requires centrally a discussion of prudence, which he maintains is a class in its own right, separate from the other sources of knowledge.

2. Ends and Means

The distinction between ends and means is fundamental to Aristotle's ethics. He sees all human action as goal-directed, and so he seeks to explain what the ultimate ends of action are.

Book I opens with a fallacious argument that since every art and activity as an end there must be just one end to which all arts and activities aim.[ii] This is a fallacy because it is possible (and even likely) that there is a plurality of different (ultimate) ends. These ends might also conflict with each other.[iii] He also does not consider the possibility that there might be ends which are good-in-themselves and ends which are bad-in-themselves. It would appear that he thinks that everything is striving for one end, and that vice arises from the imperfect realisation of that end, rather than from a complete realisation of an evil purpose. For him, bad actions arise from a failure to achieve the mark, rather than from evil intentions.

Aristotle calls the end to which all people are ultimately striving “happiness'. Ethics is the study of happiness, this ultimate aim.

We should be wary of equating this concept of happiness with any concept we use. Happiness, defined in this sense, does not imply a state of mind; it does not equate simply with, say, a state of calm satisfaction with one's life. It is not necessarily a state of pleasure. However, Aristotle will go on later to describe the relationship between happiness and pleasure.

3. Happiness, Virtue, Reason and Man's function

Whilst Aristotle accepts that a happy life is a life of pleasure, he considers the possiblity that there are bad pleasures (for example, we might say masochism was a bad pleasure). He rejects Hedonism which says that all pleasures are good, and does not distinguish between good and bad pleasures.

Aristotle claims that the happy life is one in which we live in accordance with virtue. Furthermore, the virtuous life is one in which rationality is maximised, and dependence on emotion and passion is minimised. Thus

HAPPINESS = VIRTUOUS ACTION TAKEN OVER A COMPLETE LIFETIME

VIRTUE = ACTIVITY PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A RATIONAL PRINCIPLE

Aristotle attempts to prove his definition of happiness is correct, using an argument based on man's function, given in Book I, vii. His argument is as follows

    1.     A good X = an X that performs its function well (for example, a good knife cuts well.)
    2.     The function of an X = the distinctive property that an X has.
    3.     Man's distinctive property is his reason.
    4.     A man will be happy if, and only if, he is good.
    5.     Therefore, a good man is one that is rational.

The validity of this argument is considered elsewhere in a unit on The Function Argument. [iv]

The argument imports implicitly a kind of god-given purpose to man's life. A good knife is one that cuts well because we define its purpose to be to cut. If we follow this analogy through, then it implies that man has been given a purpose to live rationally. Aristotle likes to see this purpose as a fact of human nature. It has been shown elsewhere that in this argument Aristotle commits a fact/value fallacy.

It is very important that this fallacy is grasped, for further study of his system. In brief, if it is merely a fact that my function is to live in accordance with reason, then why may I not rebel against this fact? If the answer to that is because it is morally wrong to do so, then it is no mere fact, but a value. In this case, we cannot argue from a fact (my function is X) to a value (I ought to perform my function well).

The whole discussion of function in the context of happiness raises a tricky question of to what extent Aristotle's ethics is an ethic based on an appeal to ethical egoism, and to what extent is it a duty ethic.

4. Aristotle, Ethical Egoism and Duty

An ethical egoist is a person who adopts the theory that there is no obligation upon him to do anything other than what he wants. The egoist takes only his own desires and whims, with their correspondent goals, as the basis of action. He tends to act in such a way that the outcome of his actions are what gives him pleasure and avoids him pain. However, if his whim is to do something painful to himself (such as a masochist might do), then he will not believe himself bound by any moral principle not to undertake such action. He regards every other person only in the light of means to the fulfilment of his desires and whims. Other people are not ends-in-themselves to him.

There is some debate as to whether, by adopting the view that all men aim at happiness, Aristotle is subscribing to a form of ethical egoism. There is a tendency in his work to agree with a form of psychological determinism — the view that what a person finds pleasurable he will pursue, and what he finds painful, he will avoid. For this reason, he also examines in detail the issue of pleasure and pain. He seeks to show that the happy life is pleasurable. If it is not, then he may fail to supply people with an adequate reason to pursue the happy life.

Aristotle's concern with man's motives gives his system a certain strength and appeal. If his conclusions are right, then in living the ethical life we are not required to pursue anything other than our own happiness. This supplies us with a motive to lead the good, that is, moral life. It also implies that those who do not act morally are either mistaken about what happiness is, or are acting under the compulsion of irrational desires. It follows that the purpose of ethical instruction is to (1) enlighten people as to the correct nature of happiness; (2) Educate people from an early age to have the correct disposition, and thus be able to resist irrational desires. The student should not be allowed at an early age to associate anything bad with pleasure.

In Book I, iv Aristotle maintains that everyone agrees that happiness is the highest good. However, this could be disputed — not everyone does agree. Aristotle repeatedly states that a man cannot be happy if he is on the rack, or suffers the fate of Priam, the King of Troy, who witnessed the destruction of his family and city before being killed himself. It would seem that if goodness is being happy, then a man cannot be good if he is unhappy. This can be seen as a serious flaw in Aristotle's system, for there are situations when we commend people for choosing a course of action that leads them into personal danger for the benefit of others. It is a characteristic of Aristotle's ethics that he only considers everyday situations. It is perhaps only in extreme circumstances that a man is forced to choose between his own happiness and that of some other good action prompted by duty.

Aristotle appears to ignore the concept of duty as such. He never discusses a situation in which one would be obliged to do something painful from duty or for benevolent or altruistic reasons. He also has no requirement to treat other people as ends-in-themselves. He does not regard slavery as morally wrong.

On the other hand, Aristotle's system is ultimately a duty ethic. This is the inevitable consequence of his use of the function argument. The function argument establishes the fundamental duty to live rationally, which Aristotle claims is what being a good man is. That this is a duty is implied by the presence in the function argument of notion of a (god-given) purpose, for who is it that determines what our function shall be?

In point of fact Aristotle believes that the life in accordance with a rational principle, which what duty commands, is also a happy and a pleasurable life. There are many things he says in his work that support this view, and they are worthy of consideration. However, this does not obscure the fact that Aristotle has not established a necessary connection between the pleasurable life and the life of duty. His attempt to do so is spurious. It is based on the equations

A happy life is pleasurable A happy life is the life of duty (= activity in accordance with reason)

exploits a quibble in the use of “happy'. The meaning of happiness is different in the two sentences; we need some further argument to be justified in equating them.

The argument that Aristotle supplies in order to bridge this gap concerns good fortune and moral luck. The good man also has good fortune, and so is not placed into situations where he has to make a choice between what is right and what is pleasurable. This once again obscures the duty element in his ethic, and makes it more appealing to a sort of enlightened egoism. [vi]

Since there is no necessary connection in his system between duty and the happy life (in the sense of the pleasurable one) there is a buried conflict between the two in his system — one that he has not noticed himself. In the final analysis, since the duty to live rationally would over-ride any other considerations, the man who fulfils his duty could lead a life of pain. Yet Aristotle goes out of his way to avoid a discussion of this, and he is lead close to blaming the unlucky man for his bad luck!

Another way of putting this is that Aristotle wants to “have his cake and eat it'. His is ultimately a duty ethic, but he wants it to appeal to a certain common sense notion that the good life is one that aims at happiness and involves pleasure, so that one performs one's duty from motives that are appealing in some sense to an enlightened form of egoism.

5. Aristotle and Plato

Although Aristotle explicitly rejects Plato's conception of a Form of the Good — at I, vi he uses a logical argument to do so — he is heavily indebted to Plato, who was his teacher, in many ways.

Most fundamentally, Aristotle has taken over from Plato's work Plato's views on man's psychology. In fact, he has simplified the idea of the tripartite soul back to the earlier dualism of reason versus appetite. Aristotle explains that man has two halves to his soul — a rational part, and an instinctive, irrational part. The instinctive part is also divided into two halves — a simple, vegetative part, which is mechanical and regulates our bodily functions, and an emotive part, which is the origin of our passions.

Thus Aristotle's ethics is premised in the concept of a conflict between Reason and Emotion. He claims that it is only by regulation of emotion by reason that one can be happy. The connection to Plato remains.

It is possible to oppose Aristotle's ethics on the grounds that reason and emotion are not fundamentally opposed.

6. Aristotle and the After-Life

Aristotle's view on the after-life, and the nature of death, seems a little vague, and even contradictory. In De Anima Aristotle defines the soul to be the form of the body, which might be taken to imply that when the body ceases to exist so does the soul. [vii] However, in The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses explicitly the question of whether a soul is happy after death, which might imply the existence of the soul after death.

Aristotle does reject the view that some Greeks held that the fortunes of people on earth can affect the happiness of a dead soul.

Aristotle tends to agree with the Greek tradition that happiness is not a momentary thing, but rather a judgment on a life as a whole. Although he explicitly rejects Solon's famous dictum, “Call no man happy until he is dead', on the grounds that to be happy you have to be doing something (which is an activity, and hence presupposes life), Aristotle is broadly in agreement with this sentiment, because it regards happiness as a judgment based on an examination of a life as a whole.[viii]

7. Good Fortune

Since for Aristotle a happy man is one that has a life of pleasure, no happy man can be allowed to endure a really bad fate, such as befell Priam. So one cannot really say that anyone is happy at a given time, because it is always possible that a person will run into some terrible bad luck. So good luck is another essential ingredient to the happy life.[ix] However, some reverses of fortune may not upset the overall generally happy life, for happiness is more dependent on a man's character than on minor strokes of good or bad luck. A happy man is able to endure more. Furthermore, a man who loses all of his material possessions may yet be happy by leading a life of contemplation.

Whilst this is the case, good fortune, by way of wealth and good upbringing, for example, is necessary to the life of virtue (when that his not a life of contemplation). A virtuous life involves liberal and even magnificent actions, and thee require wealth. Thus, a slave, who has neither liberty nor wealth, cannot be happy.[x]

This talk of good fortune, which is a means to happiness, again suggests the idea of some external directing force or god. It is as if the good man is also the lucky one, and as if it is because he stands well with god that he receives an abundant share of good fortune.

8. Two views of the Good Life

Since Aristotle is heavily indebted to Plato for his view of human psychology based on a conflict of reason and emotion, one might expect him to adopt Plato's view of what man ought to do. For Plato man ought to aspire to the life of the gods, which he would do by contemplation of Abstract Forms with a view to eventually rising to a contemplation of the Form of the Good.

Aristotle does accept this view. He agrees that the life of the gods consists in contemplation. In Book X he describes the life of contemplation and makes it clear that it is the highest form of living that a man can enjoy, and is necessarily also the most pleasant one. He regards the contemplative life as one involving the contemplation of scientific truths, thus parting with Plato over the precise nature of what the contemplative life would be. But his language in this context is very reminiscent of the language of Plato — he speaks of the rational element of man as being the most divine part of him.

However, Aristotle does discuss at length other forms of happy living. Aristotle acknowledges that there are two forms of happy living; these are

1		The life of moral virtue — which involves living according to the doctrine of the mean (described below), and is concerned with practical affairs.
2		The life of intellectual virtue — which is based on contemplation.

It is this second kind of life which is Platonic in its conception. Aristotle also states that the second kind of life is preferable to the first, but he does state that both are virtuous.

This raises a question — how can there be two forms of happy life? The resolution of this problem may be found in his views on choice. Thus, the resolution of this problem may lie in the observation that not everyone is capable of leading the life of pure contemplation, and one characterisation of Aristotle's ethic could be that it is Plato “watered down' for those people who are unable to lead the life of a saint.[xi]

Both forms of virtuous living involve the maximisation of the rational element of the soul. In the case of the life of moral virtue, we picture a man who has emotions, and some of these are strong emotions. The virtuous life for this man consists in minimising his dependence on these emotions. This maximises reason in his life. In practice, this involves leading a life in accordance with the Doctrine of the Mean.[xii]

In the case of the contemplative life, we picture a man who has won such a victory over his emotions, that he has virtually no emotions left. He has so approached the life of reason that he does not explicitly need to perform the balancing act required by the Doctrine of the Mean. He gives himself up purely to the life of reason through contemplation. [xiii]

9. The Doctrine of the Mean

The purpose of the Doctrine of the Mean is to show how reason can be maximised in a life of practical virtue by using it to even out the effects of conflicting emotions.

Emotions tend to imbalance you — and this leads you into vicious conduct. Using our reason we can prevent this destabilising effect of emotion.[xiv]

The underlying philosophical assumptions here have already been raised — it is these that can be questioned — if they are accepted the Doctrine of the Mean will be appealing. They are (1) that reason and emotion are in conflict; (2) That the function (purpose) of man is to maximise reason in his life, and this is what he ought to do. If these statements are false, then the Doctrine of the Mean is not valid.

At a more technical level, it is possible to argue that Aristotle's account of specific virtues as arising from the balancing of a given pair of opposing emotions is not valid. [xv]

Aristotle is at pains to stress that the mean is not an arithmetical mean — that is, it is not possible to arrive at a determination of what is the right action at any given time by means of a quasi-mathematical calculation. He does not regard ethics and politics as precise branches of knowledge. He believes that ethics involves a peculiar form of judgment, and the faculty for making ethical judgments is called “prudence'. He claims that prudence is not a species of any other kind of knowledge. In applying the Doctrine of the Mean we have to make prudential judgments in some kind of non-mechanical way regarding what action is appropriate.[xvi]

Since the mean is not precise, the Doctrine of the Mean has been criticised for being vague and hence useless, for, actually, there is no criterion of right action. [xvii] However, in defence of Aristotle, there is intuitive appeal in the notion that we have a faculty for weighing things up in an ethical situation, and that this weighing up is not mathematically precise.

Prudence involves being able to see the right principle to apply in a given situation, and to foresee accurately the consequences of an action. It requires deliberation; you are expected to deliberate over the best way to achieve a moral purpose. So to be prudent a man requires practical experience. Young men lack the experience to be completely successful and moral in their actions.

10. Choice

One of the underlying problems in Aristotle's system is that of freewill. Aristotle appears to have no conception of freewill as such. By freewill is meant here the power to choose between two alternative lines of action, not being subject to any kind of cause, external or internal. Having no concept of freewill, Aristotle does not explicit reject it, but his ethics appears to be more consistent with the view that we do not have freewill than that we do.[xviii] It is more consistent with the view that Hume later adopted. Hume effectively states that to have freewill (to be at liberty) is to be capable of acting independent of an external cause of the action, however the action will be necessitated by inner causes (causes arising inside our bodies) because, in fact, all actions are determined. We are not capable of deciding by means of introspection alone whether an action we take is independent of some internal cause. However, according to Hume, we never actually are.

The Aristotelian conception of choice is that we only ever choose between two means to an end, and never choose the end itself. Choice is the result of deliberation.[xix] The prudent man is one who deliberates well. The prudent life also maximises reason, because deliberation is specifically a rational process, and as such unique to man. Aristotle is here making the simple observation that man excels other animals in this capacity for deliberation, it is a manifestation of reason, and we should maximise its use in our lives, and it is a particular virtue to do so.

On the other hand, it is legitimate to ask, what does determine the end of an action? It is a power common to both adults and children (who lack reason); it is also common to men and animals (who also lack reason). It is volition. Further, a voluntary act is one that we desire, and is orientated towards some end, which acts as a motive for us, and is conceived as a pleasurable thing to attain.

Since our volitions are not subject to our choosing, it is reasonable to presume that for Aristotle they are simply facts about the way we are. They are brought about by (a) our natural disposition, and (b) our subsequent experience and conditioning — that is, by our upbringing and education.

This may be why Aristotle sees no contradiction in presenting us with two alternative views regarding the nature of virtue and happiness. We cannot effectively choose between them. Although the contemplative life is preferable to the life of practical moral virtue, there is no obligation to pursue the practical life.

Aristotle acknowledges the need in practical ethics to be able to decide when to blame someone and when not. For us this involves the notion of choice and involves us in the metaphysical problem of freewill and determinism. That is, we regard the person as responsible for the actions he has chosen to do. For Aristotle, it involves the question of when an action can be said to be voluntary or not. A voluntary action is an action that issues from our own bodies, but the question of what goes on inside our bodies is ignored by him. The purpose of his discussion is to establish an adequate legal notion of what is voluntary, to as to lay the basis of punishment in law. Hence, the character of the examples he discusses, such as the case of the captain who orders the jettisoning of cargo when a storm threatens to destroy a ship. Although the captain does actually make the order to jettison the cargo, his action is regarded as involuntary (or non-voluntary) because he is impelled by external circumstances to take the necessary action to save the ship and the crew. An action is also involuntary if it is performed in ignorance, unless we are responsible for that ignorance, for example, by getting drunk, or by leading such a dissipated life that we have lost our reason to some extent. An action performed in ignorance can be regarded as involuntary only if the agent would not have acted in this way if he had known more. If the action was bad and involuntary, then the agent must regret the action on discovering its true nature.

There is a question here regarding psychological compulsion — that is, the case where a person feels compelled to act in a certain way owing to internal causes. This takes us very close to the ensuing discussion of moral incontinence, or weakness of the will. Aristotle takes the legalistic view that we are responsible for any action that issues from our bodies, whether we inwardly feel that we are acting under compulsion or not. He argues that any willingness to regard a person as not responsible for the actions of his body would make a nonsense of the distinction between virtue and vice, and hence of ethics as a whole. Actually, Aristotle does feel a degree of sympathy for the person who is acting under a psychological compulsion, especially when this can be traced back to earlier bad actions, such as drinking or keeping bad company. He takes the view that such a person may have diminished responsibility.

Another topic that is relevant here concerns Aristotle's view of dispositions and habits. To call a man virtuous is not simply to say that he has performed one, or even a series of such virtuous actions. Virtue is something that we ascribe to character, and as such it is at least a relatively permanent thing. It will not be easy for a virtuous man to lose his virtue, and hence, to lose his happiness. (But a virtuous man might lose his good fortune, which is a more serious problem for Aristotle.) It might be truer to the spirit of Aristotle's text to say that an action is virtuous because it is performed by a virtuous man, rather than the other way around. So to be virtuous means to have acquired the habit or disposition to act virtuously.

So how does one become virtuous? The answer is, by imitating the actions of a virtuous man. One acquires the disposition to act virtuously be doing virtuous acts. This appears to be a contradiction (it can be argued to be one) — one becomes good by doing acts. [xx] However, the claim is that the person who has not yet acquired the moral habit (the general disposition to act morally) can still imitate the actions of those who have. It is like learning to drive. This lays an emphasis on correct education. A young man is expected to copy the actions of his elders, who have learnt to be prudent.

Yet in order to learn the moral habit, one must be well-disposed towards learning it. One must be born with a good nature. Thus, high-born, aristocratic youths are more likely to learn virtue than low-born slaves!

Yet again, this raises the issue of moral luck. Why should one person be born with a good disposition, into easy material circumstances, and receive a good moral education, following the example of older and wiser role models, and another not? This seems to suggest, but not state, that there is a transcendent directing force that decides in advance of birth what sort of life a person will lead. This hints at Plato's doctrine that prior to rebirth we are each assigned a life according to the life we lead in our previous incarnation. However, Aristotle does not explicitly discuss this.

11. The Practical Syllogism

Prudence is specifically concerned with deliberation and choice. It is the capacity to select appropriate means towards achieving a moral purpose. As such it implies good understanding, which is the ability to judge a situation accurately, and it also requires cleverness.

Aristotle wishes to distinguish prudence from mere cleverness. Obviously, the clever man is just such a man as can find a shrewd way to execute his plans. But Aristotle wishes prudence to be an all-encompassing moral virtue. A man can be both clever and vicious, but a prudent man must be not only clever but also have knowledge of the correct first principles. A prudent man must also have the necessary strength of will to act on his decisions. A morally weak, incontinent, man might be both clever, and know the correct first principles, that is, regarding the need to maximise reason in his actions, but he may lack the strength to act on what he has decided is best to do.[xxi]

The process of deliberation involves the creation of what Aristotle calls a practical syllogism. A syllogism is any argument with two premises and a conclusion. The fist is called the major premise and embodies some universal principle. The second is called the minor premise and has lesser generality than the first; however, it is “brought under' the first, and so forces a conclusion.

Here is an example in keeping with the spirit of Aristotle's views on practical virtue:

Major	1	All acts of cowardice involve an excess of fear over rashness.
Minor	2	The battle is about to commence, and I am feeling nervous
Conclusion	3	Therefore, I ought to attempt to embolden my spirits.

Practical syllogisms can link up to form sequences of syllogisms. For example, the conclusion to the above example would be followed by another syllogism in which the actor chooses an appropriate means to achieve the end of emboldening his spirits, such as singing a paean or something like that!

Thus, to be prudent, in Aristotle's opinion, one must know the correct first principles, and be able to work through the practical deductions. This also requires sufficient past experience for the actor to have sufficient knowledge of moral situations, so as to be able to weigh up outcomes accurate.

12. Moral Incontinence and Prudence

Moral incontinence, also called weakness of the will, occurs when a person finds himself unable to perform an action that he has chosen to do, and which he feels is right. He is unable to perform a virtuous action that he has rationally chosen. A student who knows he should work on his essay, but in the event finds himself unable to do so, suffers from moral incontinence.

Aristotle shows a measure of sympathy to the sufferer of moral incontinence. He praises the person for knowing and accepting the right first principles. It is natural to give way before emotions, and blame is to be apportioned primarily to those who give way when the average person does not.

Aristotle is interested in the psychological question of how moral incontinence occurs. He attempts to reconcile Socrates's view that moral incontinence arises from ignorance, with the Platonic view that it arises from conflict within the soul.

Aristotle takes the view that Plato is fundamentally correct. The incontinent man is a man who is divided against himself; he is a man in whom the irrational, emotional element can suddenly gain the upper hand. But Socrates is right as well, because what happens when someone acts incontinently is that the irrational impulses interrupt the normal functioning of the practical syllogism, hence causing ignorance of the right action as well. The incontinent man is someone who either cannot make it from the correct first principle to the specific conclusion implied by it, or who, when tempted, forgets the first principle temporarily, like an alcoholic who knows he should not drink, but who, when confronted by an actual glass of whiskey, under the press of his desire, persuades himself that it is good for him.

Aristotle is interested in the relationship between incontinence and other forms of vice. Incontinence is not the same as licentiousness, but is allied to it. The licentious man indulges himself in pleasure to excess out of choice. But there is no conflict within him as to what he should do. He is thoroughly bad. But the incontinent man puts up some kind of struggle. He knows the action is bad, and would choose not to do it if he could, but his desire for pleasure overwhelms his reason in practice.

Similarly, continence is not the same as temperance, but is allied to it. It is better not to have to fight one's emotions, and temperance is the higher state. (It is for the same reason that the intellectual, contemplative life is higher than the practical life of moral virtue.) The temperate man is often loosely called continent, and there is no harm in this manner of speaking, even though it is not strictly accurate.

The term “prudent' begins to assume an all-encompassing significance in respect of the life of practical morality. The prudent man is intelligent in his knowledge of ends and means, and in his ability to judge practical situations. He is continent or more accurately, temperate. He applies the doctrine of the mean to perfection, and all in all lives the life of reason, which he thoroughly enjoys. To be good, happy and virtuous one must be prudent.

But there is a higher moral state even than prudence, which Aristotle calls wisdom. The man who lives a life of pure contemplation possesses wisdom. Since such a life requires the least by way of material goods, it is the freest from fluctuations of fickle fortune.

Aristotle briefly discusses the polar opposite of the divine state of wisdom. A man, through the possession of wisdom, reaches towards the gods. But just as man can ascend to this state of pure intelligence, so he can descend to a state of bestiality. Both the incontinent man and the licentious man are at least human, but beneath them is a yet further state of moral degradation, which is a life of the sense so devoid of reason that only an animal could live it.

13. Pleasure

As noted before, Aristotle regards it as important that a man must have a good personal reason for doing something. A man wants to be happy. But how can a man be happy if he has a painful life? So the virtuous life must involve pleasure in some way.

Aristotle becomes embroiled in a dispute as to whether pleasure is a process — that is, a kind of movement. It seems hard for us to see why anyone should suppose it was. Aristotle disposes of this view by pointing out that pleasure does not have a beginning and an end in the way that processes do. A process is also something that is a means to an end, whereas pleasure is an end-in-itself. That is, we choose to do something because it is pleasurable; we do not choose pleasure as a means to some other end.

Aristotle's own definition of pleasure might seem a little obscure. He says that pleasure is the perfection that completes an unimpeded activity. The use of “is' in this definition is debatable. Pleasure is a sensation, so perhaps what Aristotle means is that pleasure is caused by unimpeded activity. The activity would be the exercise of some faculty of the mind, such as sight, but it is also the ability to act in general. Morality is concerned with activities, and virtue was defined as activity in accordance with a rational principle. If we are not hindered in the exercise of our faculty in our activity, then we will automatically experience pleasure. By these means, we are led to infer that the virtuous life must be pleasurable and that pleasure is the final perfection of it.

Take two examples: (1) sight — Aristotle claims that we enjoy seeing; (2) action — a man, for instance, wants to be generous. He gets no pleasure if in fact he lacks the means to be generous. His activity is impeded, and this causes pain.

But if pleasure is unimpeded activity, does than mean, as the Hedonists claim, that all pleasures are good? Here Aristotle hovers between two answers. Firstly, he toys with making the outright statement that there are some bad pleasures, and that the good man only takes pleasure in what is good. Hence the need for proper education, so that one learns to associate pleasure only with the truly good things. Secondly, he explores the answer that the so-called bad pleasures are not really pleasures at all. They are illusory pleasures. If he argues this, then to be consistent, he must maintain that there is some kind of self-deception involved, but he does not consider this issue.[xxii]

Aristotle is also interested in the psychological question of whether bodily pleasures seem to be more desirable. They drive out other pains and are very intense. They seem to be more important to those who cannot experience the higher pleasures.

But an activity is improved if the object of the activity is morally best, and so is the pleasure. Ultimately, the most pleasurable form of existence, in Aristotle's view, is that of the unimpeded contemplation of the highest objects — beauty, truth and goodness. This is the life that the gods lead.

14. Biblography

G.E.M. Anscoombe, Thought and Action in Aristotle, 1965
Pierre Defournay, Contemplation in Aristotle's Ethics
D.J. Furley, Aristotle on the Voluntary
R.A. Gauthier, On the Nature of Aristotle's Ethics, 1958
J. Gosling More Aristotelian Pleasures, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1973/4
W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 1968
Joachim, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, 1951
Hans Kelsen, Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice
Anthony Kenny, Aristotle on Happiness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1965
MacIntyre, After Virtue, London 1981
Moravcsik: Aristotle
G.E.L. Owen, Aristotelian Pleasures, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1971/2
H.A. Pritchard, The Meaning of “Agathon' in the Ethics of Aristotle, in ed.
Richard Robinson, Aristotle on Akrasia, 1969
Ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, Unv. of California, 1980
Frederick Siegler, Reason, Happiness and Goodness, 1967
Sherman, The Fabric of Character, Oxford, 1989
Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values, Oxford 1990
Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London 1985

FOOTNOTES

i. As examples of this methodology at work consider the following passages from The Nicomachean Ethics: I, viii where he tests the definition of happiness against common sense; I, x where he examines Solon's view that no man is happy until he is dead; VII, I — iii where there is an exploration of the various opinions regarding incontinence; VII, xi — xii where there is a critical survey of opinions concerning pleasure and pain.
ii. If then in what we do there is some end which we wish for on its own account, choosing all others as means to this, but not every end without exception as a means to something else (for so we should go on ad infinitum, and desire would be left void and objectless), - this evidently will be the good or the best of all things. And surely from a practical point of view it much concerns us to know this good... As to its name, I suppose nearly all men are agreed; for the masses and the men of culture alike declare that it is happiness, and hold that to “live well' or “do well' is the same as to be “happy'. (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Book I)
iii. “But the ladder, or pyramid, or ends can be made to look like a tidy scheme only by ignoring the fact... that many activities are attractive both for themselves and for the results they produce.' W.F.R. Hardy.
iv. “But perhaps the reader thinks that though no one will dispute the statement that happiness is the best thing in the world, yet a still more precise definition of it is needed. This will be best gained, I think, by asking, What is the function of man? For as the goodness and the excellence of a piper or sculptor, or the practiser of any art, and generally of those who have any function of business to do, lies in that function, so man's good would seem to lie in his function, if he has one. But can we suppose that, while a carpenter and a cobbler has a function and a business of his own, man has no business and no function assigned to him by nature? Nay, surely as his several members, eye and hand and foot, plainly have each his own function, so we must suppose that man also has some function over and above all these. What then is it? Life evidently he has in common even with the plants, but we want that which is peculiar to him. We must exclude, therefore, the life of mere nutrition and growth. Next to this comes the life of sense; but this too he plainly shares with the horses and cattle and all kinds of animals. There remains then the life whereby he acts — the life of his rational nature. The function of man is the exercise of his soul in obedience to reason. (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Book I, some slight adaptation)
v. “In a word the mean is duty ... The 'mean' of virtue is thus in the final analysis for Aristotle only the conformity of action to the moral rule.' R.A. Guatheir.
vi. Another possibility along these lines is to follow Kant in his Moral Argument for the Existence of God. It is God who ensures that in some ultimate sense all actions performed for the sake of duty alone are rewarded by happiness, though not necessarily on this earth, but in heaven. You go to heaven if you fulfil your duty, and that is why there must exist a God. However, this argument is not presented by Aristotle, and it is mentioned only to show the sort of line of reasoning Aristotle would have to adopt in order to establish a necessary connection between happiness and duty; and furthermore, even the connection here suggested would fail to make the happy man necessarily lead a life of pleasure on this earth.
vii. However, it would be appropriate to examine the unit on this definition. Aristotle's definition should not be equated with a crude materialism, to the effect that the only substance that exists is matter.
viii. “It is possible that he who is now most prosperous will in his old age meet with great disasters, as is told of Priam in his tales of Troy; and a man who is thus used by fortune and comes to a miserable end cannot be called happy.' (Aristotle, The Nichomachaen Ethics Book I)
ix. “A man is not likely to be happy if he is very ugly in person, or of low birth, or alone in the world, or childness, and perhaps still less if he has worthless children or friends, or has lost the good ones that he had.' (Aristotle, The Nichomachaen Ethics Book I)
x. “The enjoyment of bodily pleasures is within the reach of anybody, of a slave no less than the best of men; but no one supposes that a slave can participate in happiness, seeing that he cannot participate in the proper life of man.' (Aristotle, The Nichomachaen Ethics Book X)
xi. “Reason is the faculty that naturally rules in man. It is by means of reason that we apprehend things noble and divine. The exercise of reason is perfect happiness, and this is found pre-eminently in the life of speculation or contemplation. Of all virtuous exercises the pleasantest is the exercise of wisdom. The life of contemplation is self-sufficient. But a life which realized this ideal would be something more than human; for it would not be the expression of man's nature, but of some divine element in that nature — the exercise of which is superior to the exercise of practical virtue in the life of action. ... That perfect happiness is some kind of speculative activity may also be shown from the following: the gods, are, of all beings, the most blessed and happy. But surely it is ridiculous to conceive the gods engaged in trade and restoring deposits, and so on. It follows, then, that the divine life, which surpasses all others in blessedness, consists in contemplation.' (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Book X)
xii. “For if the heights of strictly rational contemplation are doubtless always forbidden to the bulk of mankind, the highest adherence to the good is open to the liberty of all men of good will.' R.A. Gauthier.
xiii. “Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy, not as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the contemplation, for this is in itself precious.' Pierre Defournay.
xiv. For example, “In the matter of giving and taking money, moderation is liberality, excess and deficiency are prodigality. Both vices exceed and fall short in giving and taking in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending, but falls short in taking; while the illiberal man exceeds in taking, but falls short in spending. But besides these, there are other dispositions in the matter of money: there is moderation which is called magnificence, which deals in large sums of money. An excess of magnificence is called vulgarity, and a deficiency is called meanness.' (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Book II)
xv. “In reality, we are on the qualitative level: to love one's wife is an action conforming to the moral rule, to neglect her or to lover another man's wife is an action which does not conform to the moral rule. But to say that the one is deficiency and the other excess is only a metaphor. Aristotle uses this metaphor because it is classic; he is not taken in by it.' R.A. Gauthier.
xvi. “Virtue is a habit or trained faculty of choice, the characteristic of which lies in moderation or observance of the mean relatively to the persons concerned, in such a way as a prudent man would judge it.
xvii. “The formula amounts to the tautology that, if something is correct it is not too much and not too little — or, in other words, that a virtue is not a vice, that good is not evil, right is not wrong.' Hans Kelson.
xviii. “The criterion of the voluntary act [in Aristotle's Nicomachean n Ethics]is not that it is 'spontaneous' or 'freely chosen' or that 'he could have done otherwise', but that the source of the action cannot be traced back to something outside the agent.' D.J. Furley
xix. “The deliberation of the agent is indeed addressed to the question, not whether to seek a certain end, but how to achieve it. But as one acting with care and deliberation, he will be aware that, in adopting the means to his desired end, he is rejecting other steps which would lead to other ends.' W.F.R. Hardy.
xx. “How men can become virtuous by doing virtuous actions if, to do virtuous actions, they must first be virtuous.' W.F.R. Hardy.
xxi. “It seems to be characteristic of a prudent man that he is able to deliberate well about what is good or expedient for himself, not with a view to some particular end, such as health or strength, but with a view to well-being or living well. ... However, it is plain that not every kind of correctness in deliberation is good deliberation; for the incontinent man or the vicious man may duly arrive, by a process of calculation, at the end which he has in view, so that he will have deliberated correctly, though what he gains is a great evil.' (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Book VI)
xxii. “To those who pursue the disgraceful kinds of pleasure we reply that these things are not pleasant. Though they are pleasant to ill-conditioned persons, we must not hold them to be pleasant except to them... The pleasures derived from noble sources are different from those derived from base sources, and it is impossible to feel the just man's pleasure without being just, or the musical man's pleasure without being musical, and so on with the rest... In every case the test of virtue — the means by which we judge a man to be good or not — is in what he takes pleasure to be. What appears to a good man to be pleasure will be pleasure, and what he delights in will be pleasant.' (Aristotle, The Nichomachaen Ethics Book X)